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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Allison and Nathan Olsen (Olsens) elect to restate the entire Statement of the Case because
of the existence of argumentation and pervasive minor misstatements of the record in the Appellants
Statement of the Case.
Nature of the Case

This case involves post-judgment collection proceedings. Medical Recovery Services, LLC,
(MRS) has appealed from the district court's Opinion and Order on Appeal, entered February 26,
2015, affirming the Magistrate Court's May 2, 2014 Order Denying 1\1otionfor Reconsideration,
Granting Motion to Strike, and Denying A1otionfor Attorney Fees. The only portion of that order
actually appealed to the District Court was the Magistrate Court's denial of MRS's motion for
reconsideration of the Magistrate Court's Order Granting Motion to Strike, Denying Motion for
Supplemental Attorney Fees, and Compelling Plaintiffto File and Record Satisfaction ofJudgment,
entered April 1, 2014. The only portion of that order of which MRS sought reconsideration was the
denial of it's Application for Award of Supplemental Attorney Fees.
Course of Proceedings Below

MRS sued the Olsens on February 3, 2011, for collection of two unpaid medical accounts.
Those accounts totaled, with principal and prejudgment interest, $3,388.56. The complaint also
sought $88 in costs and attorney fees of $1,185.99, for a total sought of$4,662.55. 1 About one year
later the parties stipulated to the entry of judgment in the amount of $4,973.46, and judgment was
so entered against the Olsens. 2
On March 7, 2014, after the judgment was paid in full, the Olsens moved to compel MRS
to enter and record a satisfaction of judgment, supported by affidavit. 3 MRS responded March 11,

1 R.,

pp. 8-11.

2

R., pp. 60-63.

3

R., pp. 96-101.
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2014, by filing its Application for Award of Supplemental Attorney's Fees, 4 along with a
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney fees in the amount of $1,147.25. 5 The Olsens objected to the
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, and also opposed the Application on the grounds that an
agreement entered into by the parties prevented MRS from subsequently applying for supplemental

Those motions were heard April 1, 2014. The magistrate court, the Honorable Jason D.
Walker presiding, granted the motion to compel MRS to enter a satisfaction ofjudgment, and denied
the motion for supplemental attorney fees. A written order to that effect was entered that same day. 7
MRS filed its Satisfaction of Judgment on April 14, 2014. 8
MRS filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion for supplemental
attorney fees on April 16, 2014, 9 which was heard on May 2, 2014. The court denied the motion for
reconsideration, and a written order to that effect was entered the same day. 10
MRS then timely appealed from the order denying the motion for reconsideration. 11 The
District Court affirmed the Magistrate Court's order in an Opinion and Order on Appeal entered
February 26, 2015. 12 In its opinion, the District Court reviewed the magistrate's findings of fact
disputed by MRS and specifically found that each was supported by substantial evidence. 13 The
district court also determined that the magistrate recognized that this was a matter of discretion, that

4

R., pp. 105-106.

5

R.,pp.115-116.

6

R., pp. 119-120.

7

R., pp. 124-125.

8

R., pp. 127-128.

9

R., pp. 129-130.

!OR.,

pp. 164-165.

11 R.,

pp. 166-168.

12 R.,

pp. 206-217.

13

R., pp. 210-213
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he acted within the outer bounds of his discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable
to the available choices, and did so pursuant to an exercise of reason. 14
Statement of Facts

The Stipulation for Judgment contained an agreement by MRS not to execute on the
judgment as long as the Olsens made monthly payments on the judgment. 15 It is undisputed that such
payments were not paid as required to forestall execution. MRS had the court issue three writs of
execution during 2012 in an attempt to collect the judgment, all of which were returned unsatisfied. 16
It also obtained two orders for a supplemental debtor's examinations of the Olsens. 17 The record does

not reflect why the first supplemental debtor's examination was not held, but the September 2012
examination was cancelled because of the Olsens' need to attend a funeral. 18
Meanwhile, as early as April 2012 Stephen Hall began conversing off and on with Bryan
Smith, MRS' s attorney, regarding this judgment. Mr. Hall repeatedly and consistently communicated
that he was willing to do what he could to facilitate a payment schedule for the judgment debt, but
MRS remained unsatisfied with these discussions and no agreement regarding a payment schedule
was reached through those discussions. 19
On March 2, 2013, MRS served a Notice of Service of Deposition SubpoenaDuces Tecum
on Mr. Hall. 20 As a result of that notice, discussions resumed, as a result of which MRS agreed not
to take Mr. Hall's deposition in exchange for Mr. Hall's personal commitment to have his firm
make, on behalf of the Olsens, two $250 payments monthly until the judgment had been paid in

14

R., pp. 210-215.

15

R., p. 61,

16

R., pp. 64-88.

17

R., pp. 82-83, 89-90.

18

R., p. 108, ,r 7.

19

R., p. 98,

20

R., 95,

,r 3.

,r 2.

fl 2.
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full. 21 The parties agree that the discussion that led to that agreement contained no reference, one way
or the other, about supplemental attorney fees. 22
Thereafter Mr. Hall personally and consistently made the bi-monthly $250 payments from
the firm's account for the Olsens until the judgment was paid in full. This took from March 29, 2013,
to March 6, 2014. 23 At no time dming that year-long regimen of semi-monthly payments did MRS
ever inform Mr. Hall or the Olsens that it intended to seek to supplement the judgment with attorney
fees incurred in collecting the judgment. Likewise, during that course of payments MRS never
applied to the court for an award of post judgment attorney fees or costs. And, in fact, during this
course of payments no substantial attorney fees were incurred. 24 Per the agreement between Mr. Hall
and Mr. Smith, while these payments were being faithfully made MRS did not engage in any other
collection efforts. Only after the final payment was made, paying offthe existing judgment, did MRS
assert an intent to collect supplemental attorney fees. 25
The assertion of a right to collect post judgment attorney fees was first made during a
telephone conversation between Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith about the final check having been marked
"Payment in Full." Mr. Hall believed that this payment covered the balance of principal and accrued
interest on the judgment. Mr. Smith called Mr. Hall to advise him that his firm could not accept the
check because it intended to seek supplemental, post judgment attorney fees incurred in collecting
the judgment. Mr. Hall authorized Mr. Smith to line out the payment in full language, but reserved
all claims and defenses remaining in the lawsuit. Mr. Smith, in turn, agreed that the payment
represented by the check had been tendered, whether or not it was returned, and reserved the right
to assert claims for supplemental attorney fees. Mr. Hall asked Mr. Smith whether his firm would

21

R., p. 99, iI 3.

22

R., p. 99-100, ,I 7; R., p. 132, ,r 3. See also Tr., p. 20, LL 1-20.

23

R., p. 99, ,I,r 3-5.

24

R., p. 114.

25

R., pp. 99-100,

,r 6-7.
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willingly file and record a satisfaction of judgment based on the tender of payment, and Mr. Smith
replied that he would not, again because of his firm's intent to seek supplemental attorney fees. 26
Because MRS refused to file and record a satisfaction of judgment as required by LR. C.P.
58(b), the Olsens promptly filed their motion to compel MRS to file and record the satisfaction of
judgment. 27 Within a few days thereafter MRS filed its Application for Supplemental Attorney Fees,
as it had indicated its intent to do on March 6, 2014, several hours after the final payment was
made. 28
At the initial hearing on the motions, the Court articulated at length its basis for not awarding
supplemental attorney fees:
And it appears to me that there was a contract reached between Mr. Petersen
[sic, Mr. Olsen] and Mr. Zollinger [that is, in the Stipulation for Judgment] and that
there were some issues with that, and they took some efforts to change that, but then
they entered into negotiations through Mr. Hall, and there was an agreement reached
how to satisfy the judgment.
Then upon reaching that oral agreement, they [Mr. Hall and the Olsens] acted
in reliance upon that contract and made those payments based on that without any
assertion that there would be additional attorney's fees at the end. And I think that's
a contract that should be given weight, or at least that the plaintiff in this case should
be estopped from seeking additional attorney's fees because they allowed them to
continue to do that.
If, in fact, Mr. Zollinger was going to ask for additional attorney's fees, the
time to have done that would have been at the time of making of that oral agreement,
saying, "Hey, we recognize that there hasn't been a payment here. There's some
additional costs we've incurred. If you pay this amount, a new amount, then we'll
consider a satisfaction of judgment."
But it appears, based on the facts, that that wasn't the discussion. It was just,
"This is how much we're going to pay until this sum, the original judgment is paid
in full." And so I'm going to - I'm going to hold the parties to that based on the
defendant's reliance upon that. I' 11 order the compelling- or compel the entry of the
satisfaction of judgment pursuant Idaho code [sic, I.R.C.P] 58(b).
I also want to comment: I recognize what you're saying about the fact that
it was done quickly, but I don't think we get there based on the reasoning that I
follow in reaching my decision. So there's some things that have been raised by Mr.
Zollinger that I'm not addressing today, meaning that you can't put the check in the
mail, and then compel it, because that cuts off the ability to pay those.
I think this is really a case of, we had a contract, we agreed what we were
going to do, we did it, and we're entitled to the satisfaction of judgment.
26

R., pp. 99-100, ,I 7.

27

R., p. 96.

28

R.,p.105.
9

* * *
MR. ZOLLINGER: ... My understanding was that there was no discussion
of whether there would or not be - would not be supplemental fees. Is that the
Court's understanding in making this ruling?
THE COURT: I think there was - I don't think there was a meeting of the
minds that there would be any additional attorney's fees. I think the meeting of the
minds is, We're going to pay the judgment this way, a11d that's what the agreement
was. There wasn't any meeting of the minds that there was going to be some
additional costs. They acted in reliance upon that. ... 29
The court reiterated its reasoning at the end of the hearing on MRS' s Motion for
Reconsideration on May 2, 2014:
My understanding of the facts is there was a debt that was outstanding, and
there were some legal proceedings in an attempt to collect on that debt. There was
a conversation between the two firms in an effort to satisfy that debt, and to eliminate
or to remove the necessity for ongoing legal proceedings.
I think that's the key to the Court's - I think the part of that that I want to
rearticulate to make sure it's clear on the record, is that the agreement in this case
was for the satisfaction of a debt. There was an agreement that if Hall and his firm
paid a certain amount, and paid off the debt, that that would satisfy the debt and
resolve the issues.
To then come back and allow for supplemental attorney's fees means that a
debtor has to shoot at a moving target. What - and I certainly would agree that if
there were additional legal procedures that were necessary after the agreement was
made for the satisfaction of the debt, that that's something that I think would be
different because there would be
presumably there would be some breach of the
agreement that necessitated those additional fees.
However, at the time the agreement was made for the satisfaction of the debt,
everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed to allow
payments to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt.
Based on that, I will, again, deny
Well, I'll simply deny the motion for
reconsideration and reaffirm the decision the Court previously made in this matter
regarding that issue. 30

29

Tr., p. 24, L. 17 - p. 27, L. 4.

30

Tr., p. 37, L. 6 -p. 38, L. 11.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED
The Olsens contend that the Issues Presented in the Appellant's Brief are insufficient and
inaccurately stated, and thus they restate the Issues Presented in their entirety, as follows:
1.

Are the magistrate's findings of fact supported by substantial, competent evidence?

2.

Did the magistrate court abuse its discretion by dcn:{ing the motion for

reconsideration of its order denying MRS' s Application for Award of Supplemental Attorney Fees?
3.

Is MRS entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

4.

Are the Olsens entitled to attorney fees on this appeal?

ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The general standard ofreview of a district court's decision acting in its appellate capacity
is set forth in detail in the recent case of Gordon v. Hedrick,

Idaho

P.3d

(2015

Opinion No. 118, filed December 23, 2015):
"On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its intermediate
appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision." In re
Estate ofPeterson, 157 Idaho 827,830,340 P.3d 1143, 1146 (2014) (quoting Idaho
Dep't of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468,470,283 P.3d 785, 787
(2012)). "However, to determine whether the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate court, we review the record before the magistrate court to determine
whether substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate's findings of
fact." Id. Additionally, [i]n an appeal from a district court's determination of a case
appealed to it from the magistrate court, we review the decision of the district court
to determine whether it correctly applied the applicable standard of appellate review."
In re Guardianship of Doe, 157 Idaho 750, 753, 339 P.3d 1154, 1157 (2014). We
freely review questions of law, such as statutory interpretation. A1cCormick, 153
Idaho at 470,283 P.3d at 787.
Slip Op. At 3-4.
In reviewing the trial court record for substantial, competent evidence supporting the factual
findings of the magistrate, the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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prevailing party. Martsch v. Nelson, I 09 Idaho 95, 100, 705 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Ct. App. 1985). Error
may not be presumed on appeal; an appellant must make an affirmative showing of such error to
prevail. Carpenter v. R.R. Cattle Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 602, 701 P.2d 222 (1985).
When an appellate court is reviewing a lower court's decision to deny a motion for
reconsideration, the standard of revie,x1 is abuse of discretion. i\ motion for reconsideration is

committed to the trial court's sound exercise of its discretion. Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57, 64, 72
P.3d 897, 904 (2003); Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). A court on
appeal will not disturb a trial court's exercise of discretion absent a clear showing of abuse.
Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 598, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001).

When reviewing a discretionary decision made by a trial court, an Idaho appellate court
exercises a multi-tiered review:
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and consistently
with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached
its decision by an exercise of reason.
Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, supra, 135 Idaho at 598, 21 P.3d at 921; see also Baxter v. Craney, 135

Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000); Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,986 P.2d 996
(1999); Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994).
In this case, the only tier of inquiry questioned by Appellant's argument is the second whether the court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and consistently with legal
standards applicable to specific choices. As shall be shown, the district court properly affirmed the
magistrate, which did act within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with legal
standards applicable to specific choices.
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II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S

FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

MRS in its Appellant's Brief repeatedly states that the trial court's findings of fact were not
supported by substantial, competent e,vidence. But despite those assertions, ~1RS fails to carefullJt

analyze the undisputed facts to determine whether, reading the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Olsens, there is substantial evidence to support those findings.
As observed by the District Court in is Opinion and Order on Appeal, "Most of the facts in
this case are undisputed." R., p. 210. The District Court found that only two factual findings were
disputed:
1.

The agreement that if Hall and his firm paid a certain amount, and paid off
the debt, that would satisfy the debt and resolve the issues.

2.

At the time the agreement was made for the satisfaction of the debt, everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed to allow
payments to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt.

Id.
MRS admits in its brief that the facts regarding the agreement are undisputed. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 12, 15, 17. Still, MRS adds a third disputed "finding" to the District Court's
list of disputed factual findings, namely:
3.

"The Olsens reasonably relied on MRS' silence believing that MRS would
not seek fees."

Appellant's Brief, p. 16. As argued below, this new disputed finding misstates the actual finding by
the Magistrate Court in ways that are subtle but significant.
Both the Magistrate Court in its oral opinion from the bench at the hearing on the Application
for Award of Supplemental Attorney Fees, and MRS in its Appellant's Brief, fail to clearly
distinguish between findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. This mixing of findings and conclusions
makes it difficult to analyze this issue. But when properly segregated and identified, it becomes clear
that all findings of fact by the Magistrate Court were amply supported by substantial, competent
13

evidence, especially when such evidence is given the liberal reading in favor of the Olsens required
by this Court's standard of review.

A.

There is Substantial Competent Evidence to Support the Finding that the

Agreement Was that "If Hall and his firm paid a certain amount, and paid off the debt, that
,vou!d satisfy the debt and resolve the issues."
The undisputed evidence is that "the plaintiff [MRS] agreed to forego taking my [Hall's]
deposition in exchange for my [Hall's] payment to make two $250 payments regularly until the
judgment had been paid in full." R., p. 99,, 3. This undisputed evidence completely supports the
court's finding that the contract was for Hall and his firm to regularly pay a certain amount ($250)
until it had paid off the judgment. The finding, though, goes slightly beyond that recitation of the
evidence.
The court implied from that undisputed evidence that the existing judgment was the debt it
referred to, and that in satisfying the judgment by its payments, the Olsens that would be satisfying
the debt. However, that implication is both reasonable and necessary, and is certainly well within a
generous reading in the prevailing party's favor that the court on appeal is required to give to the
evidence. See Martsch v. Nelson, 109 Idaho 95, 100, 705 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Ct. App. 1985).
That implication is reasonable because, at the time the oral agreement was reached between
Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith, there was but one judgment against the Olsens by MRS. There is no
evidence of any other debt or obligation. Thus, the agreement that payments would be made until
"the judgment had been paid in full" could have referred only to the judgment in this case, and
payment of that judgment in full could only mean that all existing obligations to MRS relating to this
case had been satisfied.
MRS would urge this Court to infer that the judgment referred to in the oral agreement is
separate and distinct from MRS' s right to claim supplemental attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12120(5). It asks this Court to impose a requirement that, before it can lose that right, that there must
be an explicit and specific agreement in which MRS waives the right to collect post judgment
14

attorney fees. It contends that it is legally unsupportable for a court, as did the Magistrate Court in
this case, to infer from an agreement about the manner of paying a judgment in full that the judgment
consisted of all of the potential but unexercised rights of the judgment creditor.
MRS' s argument is unconvincing.

First, in an agreement that deals vvith pa:ving off a debt, the amount of the debt to be paid off
is unquestionably a necessary term of that agreement. In this case, the only debt existing at the time
of the agreement was, as agreed, "the then existing judgment." The Magistrate's Court expressly
decided that "the then existing judgment" was the debt. The Magistrate Court did not imply a new
term into the agreement (e.g., that post judgment attorney fees would not be sought), but simply
declared that the March 16, 2012, Judgment31 was the debt to be paid off by the regular payment
schedule. That is the import of the Magistrate Court's statement at the conclusion of the argument
on the Motion for Reconsideration:
However, at the time the agreement was made for the satisfaction of the debt,
everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed to allow
payments to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt.
Tr., p. 38, LL. 3-7.
Second, the only way that a right to attorney fees and costs in an action can become part of
a debt is by its becoming part of a judgment. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the
procedure for making attorney fees a debt owed by the opposing party is by taxing those attorney fees
as costs in the action:
Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an
action and processed in the same manner as costs and included in the memorandum
of costs ....
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5) (emphasis added). Under this rule, there is apparently no separate cause of action
for attorney fees claimed against an opposing party in an action. Instead, such attorney fees are
merely incidental to the primary claim itself.

31

R., pp. 62-63.
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When so taxed, attorney fee awards become part of the judgment in the case. Rule
54( d)(l )(F) provides:
All costs and attorney fees approved by the court ... shall be deemed automatically
added to the judgment as costs and collected by the sheriff in addition to the amount
of the judgment and other allowed costs. (Emphasis added.)
In other words, the judgment is deemed to include all costs and attorney fees approved by the court,
which would necessarily include not only attorney fees approved at the time of the entry of the
judgment, but also all post judgment attorney fees and costs approved by the court.
The judgment in this case included prejudgment attorney fees and costs, because they were
approved by the court. But both when the agreement regarding paying the judgment was made, and
at the time final payment was made on the judgment, no post judgment attorney fees had been so
approved. Accordingly, they did not and could not have formed any part of the judgment.

If MRS wanted to ensure that post judgment attorney fees were paid as part of that debt
settlement agreement, then, as the Magistrate Court stated, MRS would need to make sure that it
specifically included discussion of the attorney fees so that they were included in the parties'
"meeting of the minds" regarding the payment agreement. Alternatively, it could have applied for
an award of post judgment fees and costs prior to making the agreement, so that the fees were
automatically included in the judgment. But MRS wants to have its cake and eat it too. Using a
"debtor beware" argument, it wants to hold debtors to the consequence of their legal ignorance of
what is going to happen down the road, make an agreement that may seem like one thing to the
debtor and another thing to the creditor, and then throw the attorney fees on at the end when the
debtor had no idea that this was really the agreement.
Given the context of the agreement in this case, the court was more than justified in finding
that the agreement to pay the judgment in full was the agreed manner of satisfying the entire debt
between the parties.
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B.

There Is Substantial Competent Evidence in the Record to Support the

Magistrate's Finding that "[a]t the time the agreement was made fo:r the satisfaction of the
debt, everything was known to Medical Recovery Services, and they agreed to allow payments
to satisfy the then existing judgment as satisfaction of the debt."
As argued abO\lC, the c·vidcncc is Uiicontradictcd that the agreement vvas to allovv the Olscns,
through Mr. Olsen's firm, to make semi-monthly payments in the amount of $250 until the judgment
was paid in full. Clearly stated in that agreement is that MRS, for its part, agreed to allow such
payments to be made to satisfy the then existing judgment Also, as argued at length above, there is
sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that satisfaction of the then existing judgment
would be a satisfaction of the debt from the Olsens to MRS.
In fact, the only finding added by this finding as enunciated by the District Court was that "at
the time the agreement was made for the satisfaction of the debt, everything was known to Medical
Recovery Services." That finding had reference to MRS's knowledge at the time of the agreement
between Mr. Hall and Mr. Smith about the existence of MRS' s right to claim attorney fees, and how
much attorney fees was potentially included in that claim. This knowledge is clearly established in
the record.
First, it is clear that MRS knew it had a right to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(5).
MRS is represented by attorneys who are well-known to the court in Bonneville County to handle
hundreds of debt collection actions yearly. 32 And as shown by other cases heard by this Court
involving MRS, it is well aware of its rights relative to claims for attorney fees in such cases. See,
e.g., }.fedical Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 336

P.3d 802 (2014).

32

A brief name search of the Supreme Court Data Repository for cases involving either "Medical
Recovery Services LLC" or "Medical Recovery Services, LLC" revealed a total of 9,237 cases filed from
2004 through 2015 in Bonneville County alone, in all or virtually all of which MRS was represented by
its attorneys in the instant case.
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Second, it is undisputed that MRS incurred attorney fees in this case after the judgment was
entered. Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Bryan N. Zollinger, filed March 11, 2014, itemized two full
pages of charges for attorney and paralegal time between March 29, 2012, and March 5, 2013. 33 And
MRS' s attorneys were surely aware of the nature and extent of their post judgment collection efforts,

since they had both undertaken those efforts and had discussed them vvith both tv1r. Olsen and l\1r.
Hall over the year prior to the agreement. 34
C.

There is Substantial Evidence in the Record to Support the Magistrate Court's

Finding that the Olsens "acted in reliance upon that contract and made those payments"
believing that payment of the existing judgment in full would satisfy the entire debt to MRS.

MRS asserts in its brief that the trial court's third allegedly erroneous finding was that "[t]he
Olsens reasonably relied on MRS' silence believing that MRS would not seek fees." That is a
misstatement of the court's actual finding, which was:
Then upon reaching that oral agreement, they [Mr. Hall and the Olsens] acted in
reliance upon that contract and made those payments based on that without any
assertion that there would be additional attorney's fees at the end.
Thus, the finding was not that the Olsens relied upon MRS's silence, but that the Olsens
relied upon the contract. The finding was not that the Olsens believed that MRS would not seek fees,
but rather that the Olsens made a year-long course of semi-monthly payments without any assertion
by MRS that it would seek attorney fees at the end of those payments.
This factual finding by the Magistrate Court is also well-supported by the evidence.
First, prior to the oral agreement, and despite occasional discussions about a potential
payment schedule, the Olsens did not voluntarily start making payments. But once there was an
agreement, the payments started immediately and continued regularly until the judgment was paid

33 R., pp. 112-114. (Although much of Mr. Zollinger's Affidavit was stricken by the Magistrate
Court, no challenge was made to Exhibit A or to paragraph 13 of the Affidavit, which provides the foundation for Exhibit A. R., pp, 121, 125.)

34 R., pp. 98-99, ,i,i 2-3, pp. 108-109, ,ii[ 7-8. (Paragraphs 4-6 and 9, which refer to conversations between MRS's counsel's office and Mr. Olsen, were all stricken by the Magistrate. R., p. 125.)
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in full. The clear and obvious reason for the change in the Olsen's conduct is that the payments made
were made in reliance upon the contract.
Second, both during the making of the agreement and thereafter until the judgment was paid
in full, the evidence is undisputed that MRS made no mention about its intent to increase the
judgment by obtaining an award of post judgment attorney fees.
Third, this factual finding was essentially agreed to by counsel for MRS at the initial hearing
on supplemental attorney fees before the Magistrate Court. During counsel's argument the trial court
interrupted and inquired:
THE COURT: Okay. And then they acted in reliance upon that, and started
making the payments pursuant to whatever that agreement was?
MR. ZOLLINGER: Correct.
Tr., p. 20, LL. 6-9.
In short, these findings of fact are also well supported by substantial and competent evidence.

In conclusion, MRS has failed to demonstrate that any of the Magistrate Court's findings of
fact are unsupported by substantial, competent evidence. To that extent, its challenge of the
Magistrate Court's decision denying the motion for reconsideration fails.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

As set forth above, the only order actually appealed by MRS to the District Court was the
order dated May 1, 2014, denying its motion for reconsideration of the order denying the application
for supplemental attorney fees. The District Court properly focused on that order, and this court
should do the same.
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A.

On the Motion for Reconsideration, MRS Did Not Clearly Establish Before the

Magistrate Court a Failure to Act Consistently with Legal Standards Applicable to Specific
Choices.
Based on the evidence before it, both on the original motion and on the motion for

some legal proceedings in an attempt to collect on that debt. [c] There was a conversation between
the two firms in an effort to satisfy that debt, and to eliminate -

or to remove the necessity for

ongoing legal proceedings ... [and d] [t]he agreement in this case was for the satisfaction of a debt,
... that if Hall and his firm paid a certain amount, and paid off the debt, that would satisfy the debt
and resolve the issues."35
As argued at length above, there is substantial evidence in the record to support each and
every one of those factual findings. Based on clear, uncontroverted evidence, the court concluded
that there was a contract to that effect and further impliedly held that "the judgment," as used in that
agreement, logically meant the judgment entered by the court on March 16, 2012 -

not anything

more and not anything less. That, in fact, is the reason for the magistrate court's comment that "[t]o
then come back and allow for supplemental attorney's fees means that a debtor has to shoot at a
moving target." 36 In other words, the words "the judgment" as used in the parties' contract had a
fixed meaning. The debtor knew what its obligation was, and the contract was certain. If MRS
intended for "the judgment" to include more than what was already of record, it needed to say so.
Otherwise, MRS would have the opportunity to unilaterally increase the terms of the contract
imposed on the debtor without its further consent.
MRS claimed that the Court had implied a new, unnecessary, term into the agreement that
MRS never agreed to, that is, that MRS would not seek supplemental attorney fees. But the
Magistrate Court made clear, both at the first hearing and especially in its ruling on the motion for

35

Tr., p. 37, LL. 6-18.

36

Tr., p. 37, LL. 19-21.
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reconsideration, that it had done no such thing. It ruled, it said, that there was an agreement to pay
off the debt, and the agreement did not include any provision for supplemental attorney fees. The
agreement was to pay off the existing judgment in satisfaction of the debt. Implied in the court's
conclusion oflaw was that, if MRS wanted to ensure that the debt being satisfied meant something
other than the judgment as it then existec.l, MRS hac.l the obligation to make that clear so that there
would be a meeting of the minds of the parties that the debt was not merely the existing judgment.
It did not imply a new term into the agreement. It simply determined that the agreement was made
to pay off a specific debt, and that debt was defined as "the judgment."
This is not a case where the magistrate court supplied or implied a contractual term not
agreed upon; the magistrate court simply enforced the parties' agreement based on the terms included
by the parties.

B.

MRS failed to Establish Before the District Court that the Magistrate Court

Failed to Act Consistently with Legal Standards Applicable to Specific Choices.
In its argument to the District Court on appeal, in addition to the arguments raised in the
motion for reconsideration, MRS argued that the magistrate court improperly implied into the
agreement between the parties a waiver by MRS of its right to seek post judgment attorney fees, 37
a result claimed to be prohibited in this case under Pocatello Hospital, LLC, v. Quail Ridge Med.

Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 330 P.3d 1067 (2014) (PMC I). 38
In fact, the Magistrate Court never held that MRS had waived its right to seek post judgment
attorney fees, and although counsel for MRS used the word "waiver" twice in his argument on the
motion for reconsideration, 39 MRS never made any serious argument to the Magistrate Court
regarding waiver. The trial court never used that word at all.

37

R, pp. 188-191,

38 There are two 2014 appellate decisions in two different cases, both involving Pocatello
Hospital, LLC, and Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC. In the second opinion, found at 339 PJd 1136,
this opinion and case are referred to as PMC I, while that case is referred to as PMC II ("PMC" has
reference to Portneuf Medical Centers, a doing business name for Pocatello Hospital, LLC.)
39

Tr., p. 32, L. 20; p. 33, L. 16.
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Nevertheless, MRS' s reliance on PA1C I is misplaced, because the complicated circumstances
of that case are so different from this simple case as to be entirely distinguishable.

PMC I involved a written Estoppel Certificate signed by all applicable parties incident to a
purchase by one of those parties (Pocatello Medical Investors) of a subtenant leasehold interest in

a building, vvhcrc Quail P~dgc vvas its sublandlord. Although the Estoppcl Certificate said nothing
expressly about modifying the underlying lease agreement, Quail Ridge claimed that the omission
of a provision that had been in at least one prior estoppel certificate that referred to the lease's
provision for adjustment of rents, when combined with the parties' course of conduct of not
adjusting the rents, constituted a modification of the lease to omit the rent adjustment provision.

PMC I, 156 Idaho at 718,330 P.3d at 1076.
The District Court and the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that one party's attorney's
unilateral intent to modify the terms of the Lease was insufficient. The Supreme Court stated,
We are in particular agreement with the district court's observation that "removing
language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing the same or
making the other party aware of its deletion does not establish 'mutual assent.' In
fact, some might question the propriety of such conduct."

Id
This case involves no such course of conduct. This case involved no written agreement or
any overt attempt to modify a pre-existing written agreement, although that may have been to
ultimate effect of the new agreement. Instead, there was a simple agreement between two attorneys
that a judgment debtor would pay a certain amount at a certain frequency until the judgment was paid
in full. Likewise, there was no obvious attempt by either party to impose his or her unilateral intent
on the other. The agreement simply was, pay $250 semi-monthly installments until the judgment is
paid in full, and if you do, we won't take depositions or engage in other collection efforts.
The Court in PA1C I focused on the need for mutual assent, or a "meeting of the minds" as
the Magistrate Court in this case called it. In PA1C I, the District Court found, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that there was no mutual assent to a modification of the lease to remove the rent adjustment
provision. In this case, the Magistrate Court held that there was a meeting of the minds between the
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parties that paying off the judgment in the agreed manner would satisfy the debt. Since supplemental
attorney fees were not discussed, the unilateral intent of the creditor, which was not communicated
to the debtor, did not change the terms on which there was an agreement that the payments, if
continued until the judgment was paid in full, would satisfy the debt.
The District Court looked at the case a little differently, but reached the same conclusion as
the Magistrate Court. It stated that the magistrate interpreted an implied term into the agreement, that
is, that "if Hall and his firm paid a certain amount, and paid off the debt, that that would satisfy the
debt and resolve the issues." It then indicated that this complied with applicable law, because "the
decision of whether or not supplemental fees were included in the agreement between Mr. Hall and
Mr. Smith was an essential term of the agreement," 40 relying on Davis v. Prof'! Bus. Servs., Inc., l 09
Idaho 810, 813-14, 712 P.2d 511, 514-15 (1985). But by either viewpoint, the Magistrate Court's
acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to its
choice."

C.

The New Arguments Raised for the First Time in this Appeal Should Not Be

Considered, But Even If Considered Do Not Support the Claim that the Magistrate Court
Abused Its Discretion.
MRS' s arguments have expanded dramatically since the District Court Appeal. This Court
has regularly held that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained by the Court.

See, e.g., the recent case of Gordon v. Hedrick, -

Idaho - -,

P.3d_(2015 Opinion No. 118,

Slip Op. at 9) ("The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised
for the first time on appeal." (quoting Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895,902 (2001).)
For that reason, these new, additional arguments should not be considered by the Court. But without
waiving that objection to these new arguments, the Olsens contend that none of those new arguments
support a conclusion that the Magistrate Court abused its discretion in determining that the

40

R., p. 214.
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agreement between the parties regarding a new way of paying the judgment in full was an agreement
regarding the manner of satisfying in full the debt between the parties.
For example, for the first time in this case, MRS now argues that the denial of attorney fees
where the subject of attorney fees was not expressly discussed by the parties constituted an improper
judicial determination ofvvaiver, based on Staub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65 175 P.3d 754 (Idaho 2007).

Even if this new argument were to be entertained, like the Pocatello Ho,.,pital case, Staub v.

Smith is distinguishable from the instant case. In that case, the direct question raised was whether
a pre-trial voluntary Rule 41 (b) dismissal with prejudice of a case operated as waiver of a right to
pre-judgment attorney fees. Here there was no Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice; there was a
judgment that included pre-judgment attorney fees, followed by various collection efforts, and then
followed by an agreement as to the manner in which the debt would be satisfied. That agreement was
that the payments must be made consistently until the judgment was paid in full, and the question
before the court was, essentially, what does "the judgment" mean? Staub v. Smith involved no such
discussion or agreement, and no consideration of what it meant to pay a judgment in full.
As pointed out in the concurring opinion in Staub, the then recent decision in Eighteen Mile

Ranch, LLCv. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005), was so closely
on point with the Staub case that the Court was bound to reverse the district court. Staub, 145 Idaho
at 172, 175 P.3d at 761. But the instant case is not similar to either Eighteen Mile Ranch or to Staub,
except generally that attorney fees are involved here as well as there.
Similarly, MRS for the first time on this appeal attempts to rely on the attorney work-product
doctrine, claiming that both the Magistrate Court and the District court in this case have imposed a
duty on a creditor's attorney that requires the attorney to violate that doctrine. Since this argument
was not presented either to the Magistrate Court nor to the District Court, it likewise should not be
entertained here.
But in any event, the Magistrate Court imposed no such general requirement. The question
is not what the creditor's plans are, but rather, that if a settlement of the entire debt is to be made
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between a judgment creditor and a judgment debtor in which the agreement requires payment in full
of the judgment, that the creditor either must accept payment of "the judgment" or, if it wants
something more, it must specifically include that "something more" as part of the parties' agreement.

It cannot have it both ways. It cannot agree to accept payment of"the judgment" and also require the
debtor to pay something more, for example post judgment attorney fees, without making that an
express part of the agreement. If it does not specify that the "something more" is part of the
agreement, it will be held to have agreed to settle the debt for payment in full of the judgment.
Nothing in that requirement imposes a duty on the creditor's attorney to disclose his work
product. It simply requires that there be a clear meeting of the minds about what the debt is that is
being paid off by an agreement. If the agreement is "pay the judgment in full," the only attorney fees
that are part of the judgment will be included unless something different is specified.
Finally, for the first time on appeal MRS argues that Printer aft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park

Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 283 P.3d 787 (2012), prevents the Magistrate Court from imposing
a duty of disclosure on a credit before it can collect post judgment attorney fees. Again, this new
argument should not be considered, since it was not presented to either the Magistrate Court or to
the District Court on appeal. But even if considered, the argument should be rejected.

In Printcraft Press a tenant of an industrial park served by a utility claimed that the utility
operator was guilty of tortious fraudulent misrepresentation, resulting from the utility operator's
alleged failure to disclose limitations of the septic system to the tenant at the time it was negotiating
its lease in the industrial park. In this context, the court's discussion of the duty of disclosure was
in the context of that tort claim. See 283 P.3d at 769.
This case does not involve a tort claim; it involves an agreement as to the manner of settling
a debt. The Court did not rule, one way or the other, on a question of whether a creditor has a general
duty to disclose anything to a debtor. Instead, it stated that, in making an agreement with a judgment
debtor as to paying a judgment in full, if the creditor did not make clear that "paying the judgment
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in full" required the payment of collection costs already incurred but not yet appended to the
judgment, it would be limited to the existing judgment.
Accordingly, the Printcraft Press case and its discussion of the general duty to disclose facts
in the context of a fraudulent misrepresentation case is inapposite to the case at bar, and does not
have any effect on the outcome of this case.

D.

The Magistrate Court Exercised its Discretion and Did So by an Exercise of

Reason.
The first tier of inquiry is whether the trial court recognized that it had discretion. In this case,
the standard of review of "abuse of discretion" was specifically brought to the Magistrate Court's
attention prior to its ruling. 41 Neither below before the District Court on appeal, nor in its brief to
this Court, has MRS raised any claim that the Magistrate Court was ignorant of the discretion
allowed to it in ruling on the motion for reconsideration.
The third tier of inquiry is whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason,
as compared to an exercise of whim, fancy, or illogic. Plaintiffhas made no clear challenge regarding
this tier of inquiry into an abuse of discretion, just as it has made no challenge to the inquiry as to
the magistrate court's recognition that it was exercising discretion.
A simple reading of the trial court's two separate explanations of the rational for its holding
demonstrates the exercise of reason involved. Was there an agreement? Yes, there was. Was the
agreement clear? Yes, it was. Did the defendants perform their obligations under the agreement.
Again, yes. Are they entitled to the benefit of their bargain? Yes.
Because all of the tiers of inquiry into the question of abuse of discretion have been satisfied,
there has been no abuse of discretion, and the District Court was correct to affirm the decision.

41

R., p. 154.
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E.

The District Court Correctly Applied the Applicable Appellate Standard of

Review.
In its Opinion and Order on Appeal, the District Court correctly set forth the applicable
standard of review, substantially as described above in Section I of the Argument of this Brief. 42 It
then reviewed record and found that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the
disputed findings, and all other findings were undisputed. 43 It then determined that the Magistrate
Court based its decision consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available choices. 44

III.
MRS Is NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS OR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

Citing I.A.R. 40, MRS asserts a right to costs on appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 40, however,
only allows costs to the prevailing party on appeal. As argued above, the trial court's decision should
be affirmed, not reversed, and as such MRS should not prevail in this appeal. Accordingly, MRS
should not be entitled to costs on appeal.
Similarly, MRS asserts a right to attorney fees on appeal based on I.A.R. 41 and Action

Collection Servs., Inc. v. Bingham, 146 Idaho 286,291, 192 P.3d 1110, 1115 (Id. App. 2008). But
I.A.R. 41 says nothing about the entitlement to attorney fees, or the method of determining whether
a party is entitled to attorney fees. It only provides the procedure for claiming attorney fees. Action

Collection Services v. Bingham provides only for the award of attorney fees to a prevailing party.
Because the Olsens rather than MRS has and should prevail at all levels in this post judgment action,
including before the District Court, MRS is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.

42

R., pp. 4-5.

43

R., pp. 5-9.

44

R., pp. 9-10.
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IV.
THE 0LSENS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.

As argued at length above, MRS has provided this Court no basis on which to reverse the
District Court's decision affirming the magistrate court. There is ample competent evidence in the
record tu support the magistrate's findings of fact. There has been no showing that the magistrate
abused his discretion. Instead, we have had a re-hashing of old arguments now twice resoundly
rejected, along with a whole spate of new arguments that were never presented to either the
magistrate or on the first appeal in this matter. Under Idaho Code Section 12-121, the Olsens claim
that this Court should award them their reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal.
"A request for attorney fees on an appeal to the district court is determined upon the
same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court
and is governed by I.A.R. 41. Griffin v. Griffin, 102 Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949 (Ct.
App. 1982). An award of attorney fees maybe granted under LC.§ 12-121 andI.A.R.
41 to the prevailing party. Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708, 769 P.2d
585 (Ct. App. 1989). Such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the
abiding belief that the appeal has been brought, or defended frivolously,
umeasonably, or without foundation. Id.
The Olsens contend that this appeal has been brought umeasonably and without foundation, and that
the Court will be left with that abiding belief. They should be awarded their reasonable attorney fees
incurred in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court affirming the Magistrate
Court's Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration should be affirmed. Pursuant to Idaho Code§
12-121 and I.A.R. 40 and 41, the Olsens should be awarded their costs and attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this

11th

day of January, 2016.
PETERSEN Moss HALL & OLSEN

Stephen D~ all
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